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The Trump administration released more than 1,100 declassified PDF files related to President John F. Kennedy’s assassination on the National Archives website today, revealing new details that complicate the traditional lone gunman narrative.

What Is the Lone Gunman Theory?

The “lone gunman” theory posits that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone in assassinating President Kennedy, with no involvement from other conspirators or external agencies.

However, the new files, with their revelations of international contacts, intelligence failures, and internal debates, challenge this simplistic view by suggesting that the assassination was a much more tangled affair.

Before the Assassination

Lee Harvey Oswald, the accused assassin of President Kennedy, wasn’t merely a shadowy figure. US intelligence closely tracked his international activities. In Mexico City, for example, the CIA monitored a man at the Soviet embassy who claimed to be Oswald. Yet, the evidence didn’t add up. One file reveals:

“Photos of a man visiting the Soviet Embassy claiming to be Oswald didn’t match his known appearance, and intercepted calls in ‘broken Russian’ only deepened the confusion.”
(JFK File 198-10005-10018)

This glaring discrepancy suggests that what US intelligence believed about Oswald’s whereabouts may have been flawed.

Meanwhile, Oswald’s behavior in the Soviet Union was far from typical. Unlike most cases—where only transient foreigners or students were involved—a rare event unfolded when Oswald, the alleged lone gunman, departed the USSR with his Soviet wife, Marina. A meeting between a CIA official and a Warren Commission staffer noted:

“Most comparative cases involved foreign students or transient persons—not defectors like Oswald. Only 4 out of 26 cases had Soviet wives leave with foreign husbands.”
(JFK File 1704-104.70213)

Adding to the mystery, in the days leading up to November 22, Oswald reportedly hinted at “something big.” One FBI report chillingly states:

“Oswald hinted at ‘something big’ happening weeks before JFK was killed.”
(JFK File 180-10143-10227)

Described by a source as “nervous” and “agitated,” he even attempted to contact Pavel Yatskov, a Soviet intelligence official, setting the stage for a narrative that would later be filled with doubts.

A further twist comes from a CIA memo that suggests Jack Ruby, the nightclub operator known for killing Oswald on live television, might have met Oswald weeks before the assassination:

“A CIA memo says a source told investigators that Jack Ruby and Lee Harvey Oswald met at a nightclub weeks before JFK was killed.”
(JFK File 194-10012-10030)

And FBI records show that agents carefully watched Oswald’s interactions with Soviet defectors, experts who had fled communist regimes, in Texas:

“FBI records show agents closely watched Lee Harvey Oswald’s interactions with Soviet defectors in Texas…”
(JFK File 198-10007-10013)

These pre-assassination details hint that Oswald was connected to broader international networks rather than being an isolated individual.

During and Immediately After the Assassination

On November 22, 1963, as President Kennedy was shot, the nation plunged into chaos. Oswald was quickly identified as the shooter, cementing the narrative of a “lone gunman.” However, the story took another dramatic turn shortly after when Jack Ruby, the man with deep mob connections, fatally shot Oswald on live television.

FBI records later revealed deep-seated concerns about Ruby’s background. One file bluntly states:

“Ruby’s connections to the mob made people think JFK’s assassination was part of a bigger plot.”
(JFK File 198-10007-10021)

Moreover, an informant’s account added another layer of mystery:

“Ruby said he had to kill Oswald.”
(JFK File 197-10002-10190)

These remarks imply that Ruby’s actions might not have been as spontaneous as once thought, raising questions about the pressures and influences behind his deed.

After the Assassination

In the aftermath of the assassination, US intelligence agencies scrambled to piece together what had happened, yet significant gaps persisted. The inability to confirm Oswald’s identity in Mexico City, evidenced by mismatched photos and “broken Russian” calls, left lingering doubts about the reliability of the data collected. This gap remains a haunting reminder of potential oversights in the investigation.

Internal debates also surfaced. A striking internal memo, stamped “19 JUL 1967,” concerning John Garrett Underhill Jr., a former intelligence agent, and Samuel George Cummings, an adviser with deep military ties, contained provocative allegations:

“The day after the assassination, Gary Underhill left Washington in a hurry. Late in the evening he showed up at the home of friends in New Jersey. He was very agitated. A small clique within the CIA was responsible for the assassination, he confided, and he was in grave danger. He thought he probably would have to leave the country.”

“J. Garrett Underhill had been an intelligence agent during World War II and was a retired major in Army Intelligence. … friends of Underhill and Cummings came forward with the claim that the gun used by Oswald—an Italian Carcano allegedly—was purchased by Oswald.”
(Underhill Memo [Stamped: 19 JUL 1967])

Though this memo draws on a Ramparts magazine report, it shows that even insiders whispered about possible conspiracies.

The files also reveal the complex world of covert operations. One document details the work of AMFAUNA-1, a Cuban national turned spy, who built an extensive network in Havana:

“AMFAUNA-1, a Cuban national, built a network of over 20 sub-agents, sending back 140 secret messages,” and was cautioned that “He may one day fall into a G-2 trap baited with Cuban guerrillas.”
(JFK File 1104-10070-10079)

This operation underscores the high-stakes nature of Cold War espionage, where US intelligence was involved in risky, clandestine activities.

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